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ABSTRACT
Blockchain technology has evolved from being an immutable ledger
of transactions for cryptocurrencies to a programmable interac-
tive environment for building distributed reliable applications. Al-
though, blockchain technology has been used to address various
challenges, to our knowledge none of the previous work focused
on using blockchain to develop a secure and immutable scientific
data provenance management framework that automatically veri-
fies the provenance records. In this work, we leverage blockchain
as a platform to facilitate trustworthy data provenance collection,
verification and management. The developed system utilizes smart
contracts and open provenance model (OPM) to record immutable
data trails. We show that our proposed framework can efficiently
and securely capture and validate provenance data, and prevent
any malicious modification to the captured data as long as majority
of the participants are honest.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the data used for scientific research increases exponentially,
ensuring information quality and preventing data manipulation has
emerged as an important factor in validating the research results.
For example, an audit conducted by the Cancer and Leukemia Group
B, one of the multi-center cancer clinical trial groups sponsored by
the National Cancer Institute, found an incidence of fraud of 0.25
percentage of the trials conducted [10].
To avoid data frauds such as data fabrication, under-reporting of
the results and falsifying the results to match research objectives
in critical scientific research, the provenance of the data has to be
maintained. In this context, data provenance is defined as meta-data
that describes where the data of interest originated, who owns the
data and what were the transformations that were done to the data.
Data provenance facilitates the integration of scientific data from
diverse sources as well as providing verifiability of the sources.
Also, it acts as a yardstick for measuring how far the results of
the experiments supports the actual objectives of the research and
increases transparency and trustworthiness. For example, in [15],
authors highlight the increase in transparency and trustworthiness
of research results due to data provenance tracking. Therefore, to
increase transparency and trustworthiness, provenance details of
the datamust be recorded from its generation to the transformations
to the productions of results. 1
1In section 6, we discuss two real-world settings where the provenance of data is
crucial to prevent fraud.
Main challenges for a provenance system are the collection and
immutable storage of provenance data, verifiability and preserving
the privacy of the collected provenance data. Although tracking
data provenance is important, but equally important is to ensure
that security and privacy of the collected provenance data is main-
tained. Data used in any form of research may come from a myriad
of sources and may contain sensitive information such as patient
records. Any form of data provenance management system should
ensure that the data is protected against unauthorized access. Also,
a data provenance system should guarantee that the provenance
details recorded in it are verifiable by the authorized personal with-
out compromising the privacy and violating the ownership of the
data.
Due this importance of collecting provenance information, sys-
tems such as Chimera[27] and myGrid[6] have been developed to
store and process provenance information. Many of the existing
provenance systems are based on a centralized storage model. The
downside to the centralized system architecture is that if the central
server is compromised, the whole data provenance trails could be
compromised. In provenance systems based on distributed architec-
ture, the security of the data provenance information is another area
of contention. Any authorized users can corrupt the data stored in
the provenance system. To our knowledge, the current provenance
systems do not try to validate the changes before they are stored.
Our proposed DataProv addresses these issues by using blockchain
as a medium for storing provenance information and providing
validations for each of the changes before logging the changes
using smart contracts. The immutable nature of the blockchain
environment ensure that the approved provenance changes cannot
be modified by any users once they are stored. In DataProv, due
to the distributed nature of the blockchain, the data provenance
trails are replicated on every node of the blockchain ensuring high
availability and fault tolerance.
1.1 Overview of Our Contributions
To address the above-mentioned challenges and requirements, in
this work, we propose a system, DataProv, to securely capture scien-
tific provenance data.DataProv combines the distributed immutable
nature of the blockchain technology with cryptographic techniques
to securely track data provenance without leaking privacy sensitive
information. Furthermore, DataProv facilitates seamless generation
of data provenance by authorized users and provides an automated
method for verification of the generated provenance data. It also
ensures the privacy of the data using public key encryption. The
access control policies of the system restrict the access for the
provenance data to authorized users.
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TheDataProv eliminates the need for a trusted third party storage
and verification of the provenance data using smart contracts and
randomized voting process. Furthermore, monetary punishment
mechanism is enabled to discourage any malicious changes. These
monetary payment penalties are guaranteed to be enforced as long
as half of the participants are honest. Storage of the provenance
data in DataProv is done using the log events of Smart Contracts [5]
thereby saving further cost on storage. The DataProv system also
provides customized verification scripts for authorized users to
determine whether the changes submitted are valid or not.
We have implemented a DataProv system on top of Ethereum
Blockchain [5] platform along with Meteor framework [23] for
developing interfaces for the user’s client module. The system was
then evaluated in real world scenarios of clinical Drug trials and
wheat production tracking system. The results show that DataProv
system captures data provenance with fixed cost and moderate
overheads.
The paper is structured as follows: Section2 describes the Sys-
tem model. Section 3 discuses the system architecture and walks
through the provenance life cycle. In Section4 we take a detailed
look at the various components of the system and their function-
alities. Section5 describes the two different types of the voting
process implemented for verification of changes trails. In section6
, we analyze the security and privacy parameters of the system.
Section7 details the results obtained by implementing DataProv in
two real-world environments. In section 8 we compare DataProv
with other related blockchain based systems. Section9 we discuss
the conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss some of the tools used by our system
and our threat model assumptions.
2.1 Ethereum
DataProv is built on top of the Ethereum, a distributed public
blockchain network. Ethereum is a worldwide network of intercon-
nected computers that execute and validate programs. Ethereum
provides a decentralized Turing-complete platform called Ethereum
virtual machines to run application codes called smart contracts.
Ethereum also provides a currency called ether that is used to im-
plement value exchange between nodes in the platform. Smart
contracts are codes that reside within the Ethereum blockchain
environment that executes when specific conditions are met. As
the smart contracts reside on top of the ethereum blockchain, exe-
cutions of the smart contract are also recorded in the blockchain.
Smart contract can store and control ether. The functionality to con-
trol ether can be used to build applications that require deposit and
payout of ethers such as online casino games,Identity managemets
systems . In the Ethereum blockchain platform, each computational
step has a cost associated with it [30] called gas.
2.2 Provenance Model
The DataProv system represents the data provenance trails using
Open Provenance Model(OPM) [25]. In the OPMmethodology, each
action of the current system is represented using three parameters:
1) artifact (e.g., documents, files etc.) before and after change ver-
sions, 2) an agent which represents the initiator of the change and,
3) the process which is the process that changes the artifact from
the previous version to the current version.
In our project, we represent the OPM model as a triple describ-
ing what the agents, artifacts, and process are and also number
coded relationship edges between them. For example, the action
of modifying a file can be represented in OPM as a tuple (user, file:
old version, file: new version, process used for modifications).
2.3 Threat Model
The DataProv system can have two types of attackers: an external
adversary and an internal adversary. An external adversary is a user
who does not have access to the document/data in the system, but
will actively try to corrupt the data provenance trails of a particular
private document/data. The external adversary does not know the
key to decrypt the document nor does he have access to the location
in which the document is stored. The adversary only has knowledge
of the document id and uses this information to mount an attack on
the blockchain based data provenance trail system. We assume that
the cloud storage is not trustworthy. To overcome this vulnerability,
we store the files in encrypted form.
An internal adversary has access to the document/data granted
by the owner in the DataProv system. The internal adversary is able
to change the document and log the changes as provenance trails
on the blockchain. An internal advisory cannot grant access to a
document to another (we assume the adversary is not the owner
of the particular document). The internal adversary may use the
access rights to corrupt the provenance trails by logging in incorrect
changes to the document trail. We assume that at least half of the
users that can access the documents and associated provenance
data are honest, and they can be trusted to verify the correctness
of the changes done to the data. We believe that this assumption
is reasonable since if most of the users are malicious, we cannot
provide security guarantees [12].
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We consider a scientific research setting where researchers keep
their research records as a document stored in the cloud. The docu-
ment (e.g., any data file) is encrypted by the owner of the document
(e.g., the lead researcher). Access to the document is restricted us-
ing public key encryption. The owner of the research document
provides access to the document to users by providing the key. For
a user to log the provenance information in the DataProv system,
the owner of a document needs grant access to the document to the
user. In the DataProv system model, the changes to the documents
are made through versioning. Each change related to a document
is stored as a separate new version. The system assumes that only
the latest version of the document/data file is used for modification.
The system checks the condition that any document which contains
changes not logged in the provenance data is ignored.
The system encourages truthful behavior by penalizing the users
who submit wrong change provenance details. The voters are re-
warded in the event they find a defective change submitted with a
portion of the deposit amount for the change. The users log valid
changes to the system using client applications running in each
of the individual user’s browser. Each of the client applications
stores persistent data about the documents that the current user
has access to using a back end database. For the current version of
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DataProv, meteor JS [30] and MongoDB [24] are used to implement
the client applications. The client applications communicate with
the smart contract through a Geth node running at the client side.
The smart contract system which stores the change records of the
document is monitored for change events by the client. The smart
contract stores access control policies along with details like the
time of the last change of the particular document, signature of the
last change and change logs etc.
3.1 Provenance Capture Life Cycle
An individual execution cycle of the DataProv system is shown
in Figure 1. The steps involve: 1) A user, who wishes to add or
change the result set, modifies the latest version of the data file
and then uploads it to the cloud server. Different versions of the
documents/data files are maintained in the cloud so as to revert
back in the event a change is rejected. 2) The change requester
then submits a change request to Vote Contract through the client
module along with a deposit amount. The change request consists a
digest comprising of: document Id, Encrypted form of hashes of the
previous and current versions of the data file, Link to the location
of the file in the cloud repository, timestamp at which the change
was made and also the signature of the requester. 3) The client
module submits the change and then initiates the voting period.
During the voting period, authorized user clients verify the changes
using the verifier script residing in the cloud storage. The scripts
return true if the change is valid and false otherwise. 4) The clients
cast their votes for/against the change based on the verification
result, using the vote contract. The process is automated. 5) The
vote contract records each of the votes cast by the users. At the
end of the voting period, if the requisite amount of the users voted
against the change, the change is rejected. The change initiator
is penalized by the deposit amount and it is distributed among
the voters. If after the voting period, the number of votes against
the change is less than half of the voter, the change is accepted
and the change requester is refunded the deposit amount. 6) In
the event that a change is accepted after the voting process, the
vote contract records the change in the document tracker contract.
The log entries for each change consists of the following: author
responsible for the change, the hash of the current document and
the hash of the previous version of the document, high-level OPM
representation of the current change and digital signature for future
verification.
4 SYSTEM DETAILS
The basic setup of DataProv system consists of two components.
The on-chain components which mainly consist of Ethereum Smart
contracts for access control, generating and storing provenance
trails and conducting voting process, and the off-chain modules
which consist of client application module that interfaces with the
smart contract to submit the changes and keeps timers for the
voting process and the cloud based script for verification of each of
the data file changes that are submitted.
4.1 On-chain module
The Ethereum blockchain platform provides executable programs
that reside within the blockchain called Smart Contracts. The Smart
contracts execute only when called and is capable of maintaining
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Figure 1: Provenance Life Cycle in DataProv System
state variables.DataProv on-chain module mainly consists of two
smart contracts which we discuss in details below.
4.1.1 Document Tracker contract. The Document Tracker smart
contract is used to keep track of all the changes to a given document.
Document Tracker contract implements access control policies and
maintains all the user access information to the documents. The
contract also provides methods for provenance trail generation for
a particular document. The generated document trails are stored
as events in the event log of Document Track contract. Event log
storage of data provenance trails is preferred due to cost per stor-
age consideration in Ethereum blockchain environment [4]. The
format of the change event is described in detail in Appendix A.
Each change event also stores the digital signature of the initiator
based on the message digest. The document tracker supports all the
basic functionality of access control management such as create
a document for tracking, grant users rights to add changes to a
particular document provenance history, revoke users access rights
to a particular document history and finally generating and storing
provenance history of a particular document to the log. It is impor-
tant to note that , DataProv does not store any sensitive information
in plain text on the blockchain, because any information stored on
the blockchain including the smart contract code is publicly ac-
cessible. In addition, due to storage costs and blockchain storage
limits, actual data is stored off the blockchain, potentially in a cloud
location.
The initial iteration of the provenance history is generated by the
owner of a document when that document is added to the system.
The contract enforces the constraint that granting access for adding
provenance trails for a document is strictly controlled by the owner
of the document. In the current implementation of DataProv, access
rights to a particular document are nontransferable. In addition
to the main methods, Document Tracker also consists of helper
methods for checking the user access to a document and methods
to update the owner of the document. The Document track contract
also implements checks to prevent unauthorized calls to the func-
tions. Every provenance change event has to be approved through a
voting process by the vote contract. Access to the ChangeDocument
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method (e.g., log the change to a document) is therefore restricted
to only a call from vote contract.
We chose the voting for verifying the submitted provenance infor-
mation for two reasons: 1) We want to efficiently prevent malicious
changes that obviously violate data use constraints (e.g., not allow-
ing the deletion of a patient record from the drug trial data). 2) We
do not want the verification process to leak any sensitive informa-
tion. Unfortunately, verification process could be very different in
different settings. For example, for drug trials, main verification
process could be to make sure that no patient is deleted (e.g., to
boost the success rate of the drug) from the data set due to a fatal
reaction. Also, if the verification is done in the contract, we need
to do this in a way that discloses no information (e.g., using zero
knowledge proofs [19] since contract source code and execution are
publicly observable). To our knowledge, the existing zero knowl-
edge techniques that are efficient are not general enough for all
verification scenarios needed for our use case. At the same time,
general zero knowledge verification techniques are not efficient
enough to implement for provenance capturing [3]. Due to these
reasons, we allow each participant client progams to run the verifi-
cation code off-the-chain and use on-the-chain contract to vote for
or against the change. Below, we discuss the details of the voting
process. y
4.1.2 Vote contract. The vote contract implements the voting
protocol. The contract implements two types of voting: simple ma-
jority voting and threshold voting which are discussed in section 5.
The initiator submits the change in an encrypted form along with
his signature and document id to the vote contract. The vote con-
tract receives the change and after verification generates a log event
to initiate the voting phase for the change. The voting phase time
interval for the set as t1 (t1 is set to one hour in our experiments)
during which the participant can vote for/against the change. For
each vote that is submitted, the vote contract verifies whether the
vote is valid for the current voting period. At the end of the voting
period, based on the type of voting process, the vote contract re-
jects/accepts the change based on the minimum number of votes
for or against the change. If the total votes for the current voting
period do not reach the minimum threshold of the number votes re-
quired, the vote contract restarts the voting phase. At the end of the
voting phase, if the decision is to accept the change, Vote contract
submits the change to the Document Track contract for generating
the provenance event. The vote contract currently accepts only a
single outstanding change for a particular document for ensuring
the continuity of the data provenance chain and consistency. The
protocol also contains the option of logging changes without voting
process for documents whose total user-base is less than three.
4.2 Off-chain module
The off chain client JavaScript module runs on the browser of each
of the client machine. The JavaScript module acts as an interface
between the user and back-end smart contracts. The client module
is responsible for communicating with the smart contract for the
storage of the changes, retrieval of the changes and verifying the
validity of the changes. In addition to the client modules in each of
the clients, DataProv also has a verification script module running
at the cloud storage location where the different versions of the
documents reside. The verification module verifies the validity of
each change request of a particular document.
The client modules consist of different components as discussed
below:
4.2.1 Client Interface module. The interface module mainly pro-
vides an interface for the user to interact with the smart contracts.
The client module provides access methods for all the basic opera-
tions of the system such as adding a new document for tracking,
providing grant and revoke information and also tracking change
trails for the documents. The Interface module implicitly generates
the digital signature for all the operations that the user performs
through the module.
4.2.2 Event Watcher module. The event watcher module ob-
serves the change events generated by the Vote contract. The event
watcher module reads any new change event logged into the con-
tract, and checks if the current client is tracking the document for
changes. If the current document change is relevant to the current
user, the watcher contract decrypts the change event, verifies the
signature of the change and then initiates a call to the verification
script. It notifies the client about the verification results and if the
verification result is valid, casts vote on behalf of the client. The
voting process is automated such that the user need not be in the
terminal. The watcher module uses a database to keep track of the
details of documents that the current user is a stakeholder.
4.2.3 Timer module. The timer module is responsible for keep-
ing track of the voting phases. When a change event to the doc-
ument is generated, the timer module is called for initiating the
voting interval for the change. The timer will trigger the termina-
tion of the voting process at the end of the voting interval.
4.2.4 Verification script: The verification script resides within
the cloud storage of the system. The verification script validates
the data file/document changes that are submitted to the DataProv
system. The input to the verification script includes current and
previous cryptographic hash of the document (from the changes
submitted to DataProv) and the link to the latest version of the file.
The verification script first verifies whether the hashes submitted
to the files are valid. It then compares the current unconfirmed
data file with the last stable version of the file. If any other changes
to the file other than the ones mentioned in the change request is
identified, the verification script notifies the user of a mismatch. If
there are no invalid changes in the file, the verification script con-
firms the change as valid to the user. Once the changes are verified
as valid, to prevent further manipulation of the document version,
the verification script restricts the write access to only the owner
of the original document. The verification script can be customized
according to the usage scenario of the DataProv system and is de-
veloped as a plug-in module. In current implementation, we have
developed the verification script based on Google appscript [13] to
support Google Drive Storage.
5 VOTING PROCESS
The overall view of the voting process is described in figure 2.
The voting process starts when the initiator submits a change to
the Vote contract. The initiator client triggers a timer to initiate
the voting phase of the newly submitted change. The vote contract
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Figure 2: Voting procedure for a Document change.
generates an eventwhich indicates the commencement of the voting
phase for the submitted change. The Event listener module in the
client applications reads the newly generated vote event. The client
application verifies if it is a stakeholder in the current document
change event. It then calls the verification script residing within the
cloud along with the links to the current and previous versions of
the file and the file hashes. The call to verification process occurs in
every node based on the voting protocol policy. If the verification
script returns as true then the client application notifies the user of
the result. The client application then casts votes on the decision
to accept or reject the changes. The vote contract on receiving
the vote from a client records the user decision. The timer module
will terminate the vote contract at the end of the voting period.
The vote contract counts both for and against votes and rejects
the change if the majority have voted against the change. If the
change is accepted, the deposit by the initiator is refunded back.
If the change is rejected then the deposit is divided among the
participants of the voting phase. This way we incentivize truth
telling by the participants and reward participants for catching
errors.
In our current implementation of DataProv, we have imple-
mented two types voting protocols.
5.1 Majority voting
In majority voting, all the clients/users who have a stake in a docu-
ment vote on a change to that document. The decision of accepting
or rejecting the change is based on a simple majority. If the majority
of the users votes against the change, the change is rejected, else the
change is accepted. The disadvantage of this voting scheme is that
it requires every user who has access to the document to vote. This
policy is ideal if the number of users of a document is small(e.g., less
than 5). For larger number of users, requiring all the stakeholders
to vote for every change is expensive. DataProv implements simple
majority voting when the number of stakeholders for the document
is less than 5.
5.2 Randomized Threshold Voting
Every client voting for each and every change is not efficient for
systems that contain a large number of changes and users. For such
scenarios, we propose randomized threshold voting. In randomized
threshold voting, the contract requires that a minimum percentage
of votes to accept or reject the change. Suppose the document has
n users, to accept or reject a change, the vote contract threshold is
s . To ensure that each voting phase for a change receives s votes,
the contract tries to get expectedly t votes for t > s . The threshold
t ensures that the minimum amount of for or against votes s are
received for each change.
To determine whether to take part in change voting phase, each
client generates a random number based on the formula:
Ks = Hash(Bno,ETxt ,Di f f ,Glim,Addr ) mod n
In the formula, Ks is the random number generated by the client by
hashing Bno - the current block number, Etext - the encrypted text
in the change event, Diff - the current gas limit and the Addr - the
initiator’s address. If the generated number is below the threshold
number t set by the vote contract (i.e.Ks < t ), the client votes based
on the result of the verification script. Once a vote is submitted,
the vote contract generates the random number for each vote in a
similar manner and verifies that the submitted vote is legitimate.
In this technique, the voting for the change is based on secure
pseudo-random numbers; and it is not feasible to know which
clients vote on which changes since the inputs to the hash function
differs for each vote almost in a random manner. At the end of
a voting period, if the vote contract finds that the total number
of votes is below the threshold s , the vote contract restart the
voting process. The probability of a restart event can be bounded as
discussed in Section 5.2.1. If after predefined maximum number of
restarts, the required number of votes are not received, the change
is rejected and the deposit is refunded to the initiator of the current
change. As we discuss below, we can set the system parameters t
and s in such a way that this is very unlikely.
5.2.1 Randomized Voting Analysis. In the randomized voting
based verification, we randomly choose users to vote for or against
the change. For security purposes, wemaywant to randomly choose
at least s users out ofn users available for voting. Since the process is
random, we may set the probability that a user is randomly chosen
as tn where t > s . Given this, we can analyze, the probability that
a given voting phase fail to get at least s votes. Before we do our
analysis, we use the following Chernoff-Hoeffding bound result.
Theorem 5.1. [28] Let X =
∑n
i=1 Xi where Xi , i ∈ [0..n], are
independently distributed in [0, 1]. Then Pr [X < E[X ] − a] ≤ e −2a
2
n
Now using the theorem 5.1, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2. Given n users that can vote for a submitted change,
for a randomized voting process that chooses a user with probability
t
n where t > s , and the probability pf that a chosen user does not
vote due to a failure, the probability that total number of users voted
V is less than s is bounded as:
Pr [V < s] ≤ e−
2(t−s−n .pf )2
n
The proof of theorem 5.2 is given in the appendix 10.2. We would
like to the stress that pf value can be adjusted for scenarios where
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some users are not online and/or do not want to vote for various
reasons.
For varying t values, (pf = 0.0) figure 3 reports the estimated
versus theoretical probability of failure for the case where n = 100,
and s = 60. To estimate the failure rate in smart contract voting, we
run the voting protocol 100 times and count the number of cases
where one round voting failed to get at least s votes. We use this
count to estimate the probability of failure. As figure 3 shows when
t > 70, we do not observe any failures even though the theoretical
upper bound is non-zero.
Of course the next question is how can we set the t and s values
in practice so that we do not get less than s votes for each voting
period. To decide on the optimal values for t and s , we need to
consider the total cost of voting at reach round based on the failure
probability (i.e., the probability that the total votes are less than
s (pt = Pr [V < s]) for given failure probability pf value). Below,
we show the relationship between t , s,n and the expected cost of
randomized voting process that continues until it gets at least s
votes.
Theorem 5.3. Let failure probability be pt where one round of
voting gets less than s votes given that each of the existing n users
votes with probability tn . Then the expected cost of voting process
E[CV ] can be given as follows:
E[CV ] = c .t + c11 − pt ≤
c .t + c1
1 − e− 2∗(t−s )
2
n
for some system dependent constants c and c1.
Proof of the above theorem 5.3 is given in appendix 10.3. We can
use the theorem 5.3 to find the optimal value for t given s and n
based on the empirical constants c and c1.
6 SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy aspects of our
DataProv system. Specifically, we discuss how DataProv system
handles attacks from the two type of adversaries discussed in sec-
tion 2.3.
6.1 Security Analysis
An external adversary can try to attack the current system by sub-
mitting an invalid change request for a particular document ID.
DataProv contract would stop any such attempts by enforcing ac-
cess control policies on documents. The Document Track contract
will accept only those change request from users who has been
granted access by the owner of the document. All other change
requests are simply rejected by the contract. The Document track
also penalizes the external adversary by withholding the deposit
amount for the change for the attack attempt. An external adver-
sary can mount a replay attack by using an earlier change request
signature. Document track prevents this attack by keeping track of
the latest change timestamp for a particular document. Any mes-
sage carrying timestamp less than the latest timestamp for that
document is ignored.
An internal user can be the owner of the document or one of the
users who has been granted access to the document by the owner.
An internal adversary who is not the owner of the document can
try and corrupt the data provenance trails by submitting defective
changes. Since DataProv system requires each of the changes to
be approved by a minimum number of users, this attack from the
internal adversary succeeds only if he/she can control more than
half of the total number of users allowed for the document. The
randomized threshold voting further ensures that the adversary
cannot know in advance which among all the voters can take part
in the voting for a particular change, making it difficult to mount
the attack. The internal adversary who is an owner can corrupt
the system if he/she colludes with other stakeholders and votes for
the change. The owner is the only user who can grant access, the
system can be at a disadvantage if the owner selects a group of users
who are loyal to him and corrupt the provenance trail. Although
this type of attack may be successful, it still leaves a traceable trail
on the blockchain that could be used to detect the attack.
6.2 Privacy Analysis
The privacy protection for the provenance data trail is achieved by
the use of hashing and encryption. An external user can infer only
the document id and the number of changes that are made to a par-
ticular document id by looking at the event logs. Each change event
encrypts the payload of the event so that all an external adversary
could get is the document id, the cipher text, and the signature. The
link to the cloud location where the actual file is encrypted. The
other information that an external user can deduce from watching
the contract transaction trails are to see which users are associated
with a particular document id. This information is deducible by
observing iterations of the voting contract. The Ethereum platform
provides anonymization of users through the use of random public
addresses. The users of DataProv does not reveal their identity in
the environment instead uses public addresses to perform opera-
tions in the system. In DataProv, only the file owner will have the
knowledge of identity of user of the document. An adversary ob-
serving multiple voting iterations could at most deduce the public
addresses associated with each document.
6.3 Concurrency
In DataProv system, each change is the document is represented as
a separate record.In the current system, we take each changes as a
standalone change and does not allowmultiple outstanding changes
for the same document. This can be restrictive in certain use cases.
The system could be modified to accept non conflicting changes in
different parts of the tracked document. The system could accept
changes to the document as long as they are non -conflicting there
by increasing the concurrency . The abovemodificationmay involve
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Figure 4: Cost distribution of adding documents.
adding an extra step to the verification script to check for non
conflicting changes.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the DataProv system, we have tested it on two real life
scenarios and calculated the average cost for each of the individual
operations of the smart contract. In both of the scenarios, we have
found that DataProv system performs at a constant cost for individ-
ual operations and within a reasonable overhead. We provide the
details of these two cases below.
For both use cases, we have used the following evaluation setup:
the client applications implemented using Meteor JS ran in a lap-
top(Core i7 2.4GHZ) and a desktop computer(Core i7 3.40GHZ)
running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS. The smart contracts developed using
Solidity language ran on Etheruem Ropsten Testnet. For both of
the scenarios, we simulated the tests for a setting where we have
100 users for each of the document/data file. For the cloud based
storage, we used Google Drive and the verification scripts were
developed using Google AppScript.
7.1 Clinical Drug trial
In this use case, we consider the scenario of a clinical trial [9] of an
experimental drug. In phase 3 of the drug trial process, the drug is
testedwith a patient count of 300 -1000 patients. The objective of the
trial is to find the side effects of varying dosages on the patients. The
drug trials may be conducted by various doctors in various locations
and each of the results are recorded in a common document. Each
of the experiment group updates the same document every month
for a twelve month period. In the research setting, some of the
patients may show adverse reaction to the drug. Researchers with
a vested interest may try to remove those records that would show
the side effects of the drug; and successive iterations of the same
document will be missing records that would adversely affect the
trustworthiness of the trails. To avoid the omission of records,
the verification process for each of the change iterations of the
document should ensure that the original patient set is maintained
2.
7.1.1 Add Document. The Add Document function is used to
add a document to the system for the purpose of maintaining its
provenance. The owner of the document could be the head physi-
cian who initiates the whole process. The owner generates the
2 In our experiments, we chose only this constraint for automatic verification process.
Other constraints could be added for different scenarios.
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Figure 6: Gas Used to vote phase initiation.
initial form of the file that includes the entire initial set of patient
details and initial drug dosage and adds it to the contract. The Ad-
dDocument functions generates a unique document id for each file
added. Figure 4 shows the gas cost per file added for the contract.
For the drug trials scenario, we need to add only a single file. The
average gas cost per file added is 139552. Please note that in our
setting, DataProv keeps fixed size provenance records irrespective of
the original data file size.
7.1.2 Add User. The Add user function deals with the granting
access to users for a document. The user who creates a particular
document is recorded as the owner of the contract. Access to a par-
ticular contract can only be granted by the owner of that contract.
Figure 5 gives the gas used per user added for one document where
each transaction is the addition of a new user. The average gas used
per transactions is 90559. The user details are stored as the hash of
the user address. The spikes in the figure 5 represent the difference
in the hashing requirements for the inputs.
7.1.3 Initiate Change. The initiate change function deals with
triggering the voting process for logging a particular change. The
initiate change requires the initiator of the change to deposit an
amount with the contract while calling the contract. The initiate
change function is called in the current scenario at the end of every
month by the doctors to record the side effects(if any) of the current
dosage. The average gas used for the changes is 731768. Figure 6
gives the gas distribution per initiation of voting phase for different
transactions.
7.1.4 Voting phase. Once the change has been initiated, the
client programs running in the voting quorum will verify the
7
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Figure 8: Cost distribution of a Termination operation.
changes and cast their votes. The vote of each of the participant
is recorded by the smart contract and tallied up as for and against
votes. The average gas used during this process is 89176. The gas
consumption for each votes is given in figure 7. In the graph, we see
that there are spikes at the beginning of each of the voting period.
This is due to the initialization that occurs during the start of the
voting intervals.
7.1.5 Termination: The result of the voting process determines
whether to accept or reject the changes. If the majority of the people
vote against the change, then the change is rejected. On rejection
of a change, the voters who verified and voted are awarded the
deposit amount of the initiator. On acceptance of the change, the
change is recorded in the event log of the Document track contract
and the deposit is refunded to the initiator of the change. In figure 8,
we can see that there are two large spikes. These are the case in
which the changes are rejected after the voting process. The gas
used for these are more because all the voters are awarded a part
of the deposit in the case of a rejection. The average gas used for
termination is 249812.
7.1.6 Verification Script: In the drug trial scenario, the verifica-
tion script verifies if the same set of patients given in the original
trials are maintained across the various iterations of the data collec-
tion phase. The client initiates the verification script by providing
it with the link of the current file version and hashes submitted
with the change. The verification script generates its own hashes
and compares with the submitted hashes.The script then compares
patient identification columns with the previous files to ensure that
none of the original patients have been omitted from the currently
submitted version. The verification script then notifies the client of
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Figure 9: Cost distribution of vote phase.
the result. In the drug trials scenario, the verification script checks
if all the patients records are retained in subsequent iterations. The
run times of the verification script which depends on the data file
size and the verification complexity ,for data files that contain 1000
to 5000 patients, the verification run time vary between 7 secs to
31 secs.
7.2 Tracking Wheat Production
The second provenance relevant scenario that the system was
adopted to is for the farming industry. The industry keeps track of
the annual crop production of a given country. We implemented
and tested our system based on the annual wheat production data
system [29]. The Wheat production data file is updated quarterly
and contains the quantitative details such as total production, total
disappearance, and imports.
Our provenance system implements randomized threshold vot-
ing to confirm each change to the file. The Add User, initiate vote,
initiate change functions of the system use the same amount of gas
as with the drug trial scenario so we do not report here. The voting
phase and the termination phase saw a slight increase in the gas
amount used.
7.2.1 Initiate vote phase: During this phase a change to a docu-
ment is submitted to the Vote Contract. The vote contract verifies
the current user’s access to the document and initiates the voting
protocol.The average gas used is 778979.5.
7.2.2 Vote phase: We implemented the threshold voting method
in the system. The participating nodes generate the random number
and votes if the random number falls within the defined threshold.
The vote contract checks if the vote is valid before recording the
vote. We simulated an internal adversary who votes out of turn.
The adversary controlled nodes vote even if the random number
generated does not fall within the threshold. The contract rejects
these votes. The gas used for such rejections are lower than the
valid votes. The average gas used is 90862.The cost distribution per
votes registered is illustrated in figure 9.
7.2.3 Termination: The timer module terminates voting phase
after a fixed time interval. In the threshold voting, the voting pro-
cess is restarted if the threshold amount of votes are not received
for a particular change. The average rate of restarts for a partic-
ular change has been found out to be 3. Our results show that
restarting consumes less gas (Same amount of gas as that of sub-
mitting change) than termination of the change phase. The cost for
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Figure 11: Cumulative gas consumption for the voting pro-
cess
the termination operation is similar to the ones obtained obtained
in the clinical trails experiment and not reported here.The cost
distribution per votes registered is illustrated in figure 10.
7.2.4 Verification Script: The verification script of the system
compares the current files year on year data with that of the verified
data. In Wheat Tracking use case, for data files that contain 1KB to
5KB patients, the verification run time vary between 10 secs to 45
secs.
7.3 Operation Cost
By observing the system contract executions in the above scenarios,
we see that for an individual functions such as add user or add
document,the gas used per transaction remains almost constant.
The cumulative gas used for any individual function is a near linear
function (e.g., as shown in figure11 for vote function).
The gas usage is calculated at an average of 0.00000002 ethers
per gas used. At the time of experimentation, a single ether cost is
90 US dollars. The table1 shows the average gas used for various
operations of the DataProv system. As the results indicate most
operations can be executed with relatively little cost.
7.4 Contract Execution Duration
The time taken to perform each of the operations in the system is
represented in the table 2. We can see that all the operations take
near constant time to perform. The time taken for each operation
is taken as the average time taken per thousand operations. The
execution time of each of the above operations depends on the
network speed and the speed of mining of the blocks, but in long
Operation Avg gas spent cost(USD)
Add Document 139552 0.2511936
Add User 90559 0.1630062
Initiate Change 731351.5 1.3164327
Vote 89176.33 0.160517394
Record Change 249812 0.4496616
Table 1: Cost of operations in the DataProv System
Operation Time Taken(ms)
Add Document 926
Add User 877
Initiate Change 858
Vote 829
Record Change 950
Table 2: Time for operations in the DataProv System
run these times remain near constant and take less than a second
in all of the usage scenarios.
8 RELATEDWORK
Recently there have been several research studies that leverage
blockchain as a platform for building trusted systems. Below, we
summarize this work and discuss its relationship to our work.
Access control: In [17], authors explain the use of blockchain as a
trans-organizational authentication system. Themedrec system pro-
posed in [1] implements access control for medical records across
medical institutions through the usage of the public blockchain.
Fairaccess system discussed in [26] is a decentralized access control
system for the Internet of things devices using blockchain tech-
nology. In our DataProv system, we also implement access control
policies, our focus is in the capturing of provenance data.
Trusted Authority system: The legal aspect of using blockchain as
a verifiable trusted source was further expanded upon by common
accords group [2] and in [11]. These work describe leveraging data
stored in a public blockchain as a verifiable evidence in a court
of law. Namecoin[7] system uses the blockchain technology as a
trusted source for the Domain Name System (DNS). Our DataProv
system eliminates the need for storing data on transactions by
using the event logs of the smart contract to store the provenance
trails. The smart contracts on top of the Ethereum platform acts as
a decentralized trusted authority regarding all provenance trails
stored. The provenance trails generated is also trustworthy as the
decision to accept or reject a change depends on the voting protocol.
DataProv therefore acts as a decentralized trust based system for
data provenance.
Privacy preserving blockchain systems: The DECENT system dis-
cussed in [21] uses the blockchain along with the smart contracts
to implement key management services. It implements the idea of
secret sharing to securely share keys in a public environment.The
Hawk system proposed in [18] implements the concept of zero
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knowledge proofs combined with encryption to implement pri-
vacy preserving blockchain systems. The Hawk system uses two
components: an on-chain component which uses smart contracts
and zero-knowledge proofs to facilitates betting protocols and the
off-chain components which generates zero knowledge proofs for
the system. The Hawk system show how secure computations can
be implemented on top of a public system such as the blockchain. .
The use of secret sharing techniques for protecting sensitive infor-
mation is further discussed in [16]. Compared to these works, the
DataProv system utilizes encryption and hashing to preserve the
privacy of the data stored in the public ethereum blockchain and
secure communication channels between the smart contract and
client machines to preserve the privacy. For efficiency and general-
izable reasons, verification of the captured provenance data is done
off-the-chain.
Security in smart contracts: The common security vulnerabilities
in the smart contracts are discussed in [18]. This work illustrates
a number of security issues in smart contracts such as call stack
bug, block hash bug, and miners withholding the addition of blocks
to gain an unfair advantage. This work further discusses how to
avoid these pitfalls by including additional access verification and
cryptographic primitives like encryption and hashing. Compared
to these works, DataProv implements digital signatures to avoid
malicious logging of provenance data. It uses an encrypted form
of the provenance trails to avoid revealing details such as the loca-
tion of the files and the user access information. DataProv further
restricts the access to methods based on checks implemented on
the user address.
Data Provenance: Leveraging the blockchain as a data prove-
nance tracker was first discussed by the Project Provenance [22]. In
this work, blockchain transactions are used to store provenance de-
tails of food products from production to the consumer. In addition,
in [14], the use of blockchain as provenance platform is presented as
one of the four breakout cases of the blockchain platform. The use
of bitcoin as a data provenance system for research scenario was
further explored in [8]. The author suggested the idea of storing the
research objectives as an encoded file in the data fields of bitcoin
transactions. Compared to these works, the DataProv system adopts
the immutability of the blockchain environment and implements a
full stack privacy preserving, verified data provenance store with
access control policies. The provenance chains that are generated
by the DataProv system are stored as event logs there by saving
costs on storage. The system facilitates the verification of these
provenance events by any authorized users. DataProv provides a
platform to implement custom verification scripts suited for the
application area. The system ensures privacy by using public key
encryption and preserves integrity by the use of digital signatures.
The ProvChain [20] system provides a data provenance system
based on blockchain technology. The ProvChain system uses mon-
itor programs called ’hooks’ to track the changes that occur in
the cloud storage system and records each and generates events
corresponding to the actions of the users. The user events thus
recorded are then stored on the blockchain as transactions. The ver-
ification process is achieved by an external entity known as auditor.
The auditor generates transaction receipts using Tieron API [22].
The Provchain system verifies the changes after the information is
logged on to the blockchain. The DataProv differs from Provchain
by implementing automated verification scripts and rejecting the
invalid changes. The change hash-chain generated by the DataProv
records only the changes that are verified by the verification script.
This guarantees that the changed document is always valid and
prevents any chance of collusion between the auditor and the stake-
holders. Another major difference of compared to Provchain is that
DataProv implements incentivized voting using smart contracts
to penalize the users who tries to log invalid changes to the sys-
tem. The use of randomized voting reduces the centralization of
the verification process. Therefore, there is no need for a physical
verifier as the verification script verifies the changes before voting
on the changes. The advantage of developing verification script is
that a verification script for a scenario could be reused by similar
applications there by reducing the cost of development.
9 CONCLUSION
The DataProv is a blockchain based system that provides access con-
trol based privacy-preserving data provenance trails. In DataProv
system, an authorized user can verify the changes that are made
to any data file. It also provides a proof of change with the use of
digital signatures and timestamping. The system ensures that the
change logs in the blockchain environment are only accessed by
the authorized users with appropriate keys. The DataProv system
further enhances trustworthiness of the data trails by implementing
randomized voting for the change trails recorded/captured and any
deviation is punished by a monetary penalty using smart contracts.
The evaluation of the system based on two real life scenarios has
shown that individual operations of the system runs with acceptable
cost and near constant time.
10 APPENDIX
10.1 Change Log Event Format
change(docid,agent,EK (docid,H (Xo ),H (Xn ),link,ts),OPM,siдnk )
where
docid = unique identifier of the Document.
agent = address of change initiator
EK = Encrypted Text
H (Xo )= Hash of previous file version
H (Xn )= Hash of new file version
link = link to cloud storage location
opm = High level representation of the OPM model
ts = latest timestamp
siдnk = signature of initiator based on Encrypted text
10.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Proof. Let Vi be the indicator variable that gets the value 1 if
ith user is selected by the randomized voting process. By definition,
we can write V =
∑n
i=1Vi . Therefore, expected value of V can be
written as:
E(V ) = E(
n∑
i=1
Vi ) = n ∗ E(V1) = n ∗ ( t
n
− pf ) = t − n.pf
Now we can use the theorem 5.1, and set a = (t − n.pf − s) and
E[V ] = t − n.pf . This concludes the proof. □
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10.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Proof. For a given one round voting failure probability pt and
the cost of one round voting Ct , we can compute the expected cost
of voting phase (i.e., voting continues till we have a round where
at least s users voted) as follows:
E[CV ] = (1 − pt ).Ct + pt (E[CV ] +Ct )
= Ct . + pt .E[CV ]
=
Ct
1 − pt
In the above equation we use the fact that the expected cost isCt if
there is no failure. If there is failure, we pay the cost of one round
of voting and then restart the voting from scratch. Solving this
recursive equation gives us the required result. Furthermore, our
empirical analysis show that total cost of one round voting Ct is
a linear function of t , and can be represented as a linear function
c .t + c1 for some constants c and c1. So replacing Ct = c .t + c1
and using the theorem 5.2 to bound pt ≤ e−
2∗(t−s )2
n concludes our
proof. □
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